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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp. 
1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court below properly interpret the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 & 6 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995). The 
court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness without deference to the 
decision of the court below. State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638 
(Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Art. V, § 1. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 12. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 18. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995). 
The constitutional provisions not previously included 
in the addendum to appellants' brief are set forth in the 
addendum to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court judge properly interpreted the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 to limit the 
circumstances under which the Board of Pardons and Parole may 
enter an order of restitution as a condition of parole to cases 
where an inmate has previously received an order of restitution 
as a part of his sentence or where the restitution is to 
compensate the State for expenses associated with special 
circumstances arising during his incarceration. By doing so, 
the court avoided the constitutional conflicts raised by the 
1 
State's interpretation of the statutes. Specifically, Mr. 
Stilling asserted below that if the Board had been authorized 
by the legislature to order restitution for his underlying 
crime when the sentencing judge had refused to do so, such 
action would violate both the separation of powers doctrine and 
double jeopardy. Further, because the legislation in question 
was enacted after Mr. Stilling had been sentenced for his 
crime, he argued that application of the statutes to him would 
be prohibited by the constitutional prohibition against ex post 
facto laws. 
Judge Lewis' decision avoids these obvious 
constitutional conflicts while at the same time giving effect 
to the express language of the statutes. Accordingly, her 
decision should be affirmed. 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
STATUTES IN QUESTION SO AS TO AVOID CONFLICT 
WITH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
In evaluating the construction of the statutes by the 
trial court, this Court must bear in mind that the petitioner's 
challenge below was premised, in part, upon constitutional 
grounds. He argued that any statute which purported to 
authorize the Board of Pardons and Parole to impose restitution 
orders in the case of an inmate who had not received a 
restitution order as a part of his original sentence would 
violate both the separation of powers and double jeopardy 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. In interpreting the 
ambiguous provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 (Rep. 
Vol. 8B 1995), Judge Lewis followed the axiomatic rule that 
courts should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional 
2 
conflicts. See, Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1990). The constitutional conflict raised by the State's 
interpretation of the statutes is obvious, as it argues that 
the statutes empower the Board to engage in a function which is 
judicial in nature and which has already been ruled upon by a 
judge. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole is a part of the 
executive department of government and its powers are set forth 
in Art. VII § 12 of the Utah Constitution. It has the power to 
grant parole and "remit fines, forfeitures and restitution 
orders" subject to regulations provided by statute. The 
Constitution does not empower the Board to impose fines, 
forfeitures or restitution orders. 
Restitution is an authorized punishment for criminal 
conviction. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995). 
Restitution imposed in a sentence is penal in nature. State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992). The decision to 
include or exclude an order of restitution is one to be made by 
the sentencing judge pursuant to defined standards. 
Any construction of §§ 77-27-5 and 6 which would 
authorize the Board to impose orders of restitution on inmates 
who did not receive such a sentence from the court would not 
only expand the authority of the Board beyond that provided by 
the Constitution, it would violate the separation of powers 
provision of Art. V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution. This is 
true because it would purport to empower executive department 
officials to perform judicial duties. It is beyond dispute 
that sentencing is a core judicial function. As stated in Salt 
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Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 853 (Utah 1994), "only judges 
may enter judgments and impose sentence . . .". In holding 
that the legislature could not grant judicial authority to 
court commissioners without violating the separation of powers 
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the legislature has 
no right to vest judicial authority in non-judges and the 
attempt to do so, "is, in and of itself, a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine." 881 P.2d at 852. 
If, as the state suggests, the legislature's purpose 
in enacting Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 was to grant the 
Board the power to revisit the prior decision of the sentencing 
judge regarding restitution, and to do so using the same 
guidelines established for the judge in making the original 
sentencing decision, then there can be no question that the 
legislature's action was beyond its authority. Any attempt to 
. . . place the exercise of the 
judicial power outside the 
control of the judiciary 
threatens "the fundamental 
integrity of the judicial 
branch." Thus, if we were to 
conclude that [a statute] 
represents an attempt by the 
legislature or executive branch 
to encroach on the judiciary's 
constitutionally marketed role, 
we would be obligated to strike 
it down. 
Ohms, supra, at 867 (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In 
re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 [Utah 1988]). 
The Supreme Court has previously invalidated 
legislative attempts to confer judicial authority upon an 
executive department agency. See, In Re Woodward, 384 P.2d 110 
(Utah 1963) (legislature's attempt to place juvenile court 
4 
under control of public welfare commission violated Art. V, § 1 
of the State Constitution). 
Furthermore, because an order of restitution is a 
part of a criminal defendant's possible sentence, when a 
decision is made about restitution by the sentencing judge, 
that decision cannot be revisited by anyone, let alone an 
executive department agency. As noted in Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788, 793 (Utah 1990), "[wjhen
 a person has been sentenced 
under a statute, that person has incurred a penalty under the 
statute". The double jeopardy clauses of the State and Federal 
Constitutions prohibit multiple punishment for the same 
offense. State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1987). 
Because an order of restitution is penal in nature, double 
jeopardy prohibits the imposition of such a sanction after the 
defendant has already received one punishment for his offense. 
See, State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1995); United 
States v. Haloer, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
Given these constitutional infirmities with the 
State's suggested construction of §§ 77-27-5 and 6, Judge Lewis 
correctly chose to interpret the language of the statutes to 
permit orders of restitution to be imposed and enforced by the 
Board as a condition of parole only when restitution had been 
ordered by the sentencing judge or where restitution is for the 
"recovery of any or all costs incurred by the Department of 
Corrections or the state or any other agency arising out of the 
defendant's needs or conduct". Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6(3) 
(Rep. Vol 8B 1995). By so limiting the scope of the Board's 
power under the statutes in question, the court below gave 
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effect to the express terms of the statute while avoiding the 
potential constitutional infirmities of the legislation 
presented by the State's position regarding the breadth of the 
legislation. Such a construction by the trial court was proper 
and it is incumbent upon this Court to give the legislation an 
interpretation which avoids constitutional conflicts. As 
acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, "[i]t is the duty of 
[an appellate] [c]ourt to construe a statute to avoid 
constitutional infirmities whenever possible". State v 
Lindauist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983). This requirement 
includes interpreting statutes in such a way as to avoid having 
to resolve potential constitutional questions presented if the 
State's interpretation of a statute is adopted. See, Provo 
City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). 
As Judge Lewis' construction is not contrary to the 
express terms of the statute in question and avoids the need 
for resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petition 
below, it should be affirmed by this Court. 
As an additional basis for granting petitioner's 
writ, the court below held that the statutes in question could 
not be applied retroactively to Mr. Stilling because it would 
impact on his vested rights and that the attempted application 
of the provisions to Mr. Stilling's situation would constitute 
a violation of the ex post facto prohibitions of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
The statutes in issue were passed after petitioner 
had been sentenced in the trial court and no restitution 
ordered. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Rep.Vol. 7A 
6 
1993), statutes passed by the Utah Legislature are not 
retroactive unless expressly so declared. In Smith v. Cook, 
803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
legislation dealing with the maximum terms of criminal 
defendants' probation passed after a particular defendant had 
received his sentence, were substantive and could not be 
applied to that defendant. Because the legislation in question 
in this case purported to allow the Board to impose an 
additional financial penalty on petitioner which was not 
authorized at the time of his sentencing, the court below held 
that the statute impacted his vested rights and could not, 
consistently with Smith, be applied retroactively. 
The court further concluded that such an 
interpretation was required to avoid a conflict with Art. I, 
§ 18 of the Utah Constitution, banning ex post facto laws. 
Prior to the 1985 amendments to §§ 77-217-5 and 6, the 
legislature had not authorized the Board of Pardons to impose 
restitution orders. Even if it is assumed that the legislature 
had the constitutional authority to grant such power to the 
Board, the legislature's action could only apply prospectively. 
In Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790 
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that 
amendments to the statutory scheme governing the procedures of 
the Board cannot be applied to inmates who committed their 
crimes prior to the enactment of the new statute if the change 
is detrimental to the inmate. The court held that to permit 
any subsequently enacted legislation to adversely affect an 
inmate's chance for commutation would violate Art. I, § 18 of 
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the Utah Constitution. Other courts have held that orders of 
restitution, not authorized when a defendant's crime was 
committed, are punishments within the meaning of the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws. For example, in Matter 
of Appeal in Maricopa County Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943 
(Ariz.App. 1984), the court held that it was a violation of the 
Federal Constitution to seek to impose restitution against 
individuals whose offenses occurred before the passage of the 
statute authorizing restitution orders and that it would also 
be a violation to make compliance with restitution orders a 
condition of parole. Id. at 946. 
As an order of restitution resulting from criminal 
conviction is a sentencing option, the established law is that 
"the law in force at the time of sentencing govern[s] and . . . 
an amendment to [a] statute passed after sentence has no effect 
on the matter7'. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). 
Accordingly, even if the legislature could authorize the Board 
to impose a sentence on an inmate, it could only do so 
prospectively and not as to individuals who had already been 
sentenced when the new law was passed. 
It should be remembered that the reference to the ex 
post facto laws prohibition in Judge Lewis' decision merely 
presents an additional constitutional conflict which is wholly 
avoided by affirming her interpretation of the statutes in 
issue, which provides an additional reason for doing so. 
The State's final argument, that the failure of the 
Constitution to expressly grant the Board power to impose 
orders of restitution doesn't necessarily preclude them from 
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doing so, does not address an issue ruled upon by the trial 
court. To say that an executive department agency may have 
authority to take actions necessary to performing its 
constitutionally defined duties even if those actions aren't 
expressly articulated in the Constitution itself, is no 
response to the argument that an executive agency cannot 
perform functions of the judicial branch of government or 
impose multiple punishments for crime in violation of express 
prohibitions of the Constitution. If the Constitution gave the 
Board the authority to make such orders, then an argument could 
be made that it, therefore, was defining such conduct not to be 
a judicial function or prohibited by double jeopardy 
protections. Where the Constitution is silent on the authority 
of the Board to make orders of restitution, recourse must be 
made to the express prohibition of the Constitution on the 
agency's action. It was those prohibitions that Judge Lewis 
avoided having to address by construing the statues at issue as 
not permitting the Board to impose an additional punishment on 
an inmate. 
As the issue addressed in the State's final argument 
is not a basis for the decision of the court below, it would 
serve no purpose for this Court to render an advisory opinion 
regarding the authority of the Board to undertake actions not 
expressly delegated to it by the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Lewis' interpretation of §§ 77-27-5 and 6 is 
consistent with the express language of those provisions and 
avoids obvious constitutional conflicts with the separation of 
9 
powers, double jeopardy and ex post facto provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment entered below 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 1996. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckerslaar ^§^~ 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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A D D E N D U M 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
An I. ii 18 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing con-
tracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto \av>, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be nassed 
